Auto-ID: The Terrorist’s Tool?

Posted on 11 November 2010

Codegate delivers mobile track and trace solutions to help improve corporate efficiency through electronic monitoring of business processes enabling their measurement, and thereby aiding informed management. As you know, the technology we use is generally referred to as Automatic Identification (Auto-ID), but covers a vast array of applications and solutions.

Recent news headlines have illustrated an entirely undesirable aspect of our industry. Auto-ID provides the underlying technology used by international couriers and freight transporters to enable senders of packages to follow their progress on-line. Each stage of the package delivery is recorded by scanning a unique barcode assigned to the shipment. The date and time it arrived at the dispatching depot, left for the airport, arrived at Customs, when it arrives at the receiving freight hub, is loaded on to a delivery van and finally, when the signature of the recipient is captured. This can all be recorded and posted on a web portal for the sender to view. This process has provided transparency and visibility for countless users of international freight and courier customers.

However, these track and trace techniques provide terrorists with the same visibility of the progress of a package, whatever it may contain. Does this mean international couriers and indeed any freight management should cease to provide this visibility or should better screening techniques be employed to identify suspect packages? Unfortunately either option is a simplification of a far more complicated problem.

The benefits provided by Auto-ID, tracking items through any process whether it’s delivery of a package or the use of an asset, are well proven. It is this technology that ensures the luggage of a ‘no show’ passenger can be quickly located and removed from the hold of an aircraft. It’s also the technology that enables the authorities to track where a package, identified by intelligence as suspicious is, in the delivery or transportation process.

We could make the progress of the shipment less visible to the sender, delay the information being displayed on the web portal or revert to only providing confirmation of receipt on arrival at the package’s destination, leaving the terrorist guessing about its location during the delivery process. But, neither of these addresses the main issue; we have to find ways of stopping dangerous packages being shipped altogether.

International trade relies on the shipment of samples, prototypes and trial units, and this must be allowed to continue. But as screening for modern explosives such as PETN are currently unavailable, how do we protect our freight workers from the potential hazard. Obviously investment must be directed to researching how we could effectively detect dangerous packages through screening at the package entry point. Airports are introducing full body screening equipment in a bid to identify terrorists before they enter an aircraft, do we need the same approach to freight, would it work and, is it affordable?

What do you think? I’d be interested in your thoughts.